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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
EDWARD H. JAMES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920264-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first 
degree felony criminal conviction from the district court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the Federal Constitution require the suppression of 
Mr. James' pre- and post-Miranda admissions? 
2. Does the Utah Constitution require the suppression of 
Mr. James' pre- and post-Miranda admissions? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
While the drafting of the trial court's written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law is at issue, the facts in this case are 
undisputed, allowing this Court to review the trial court's legal 
conclusions as to the admissibility of Mr. James' admissions under 
the correction of error standard of review. See State v. Sampson. 
808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1990). This Court owes no deference 
to the court's legal conclusions, despite the fact that some of them 
are couched as findings. Id. at 1104. The voluntariness of a 
confession is a question of law. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 
(1985). See also State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 464 n.76 and 466 
(Utah 1988) (l,/[I]t is the duty of an appellate court . . . 'to 
examine the cmtire record and make and independent determination of 
the ultimate issue of voluntariness.,fl; court apparently treated as 
a question of law the trial court7s improper ruling admitting 
statements taken in violation of Miranda)(citations omitted). But 
see Layton City v.Araaon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Utah App. 
1991)(characterizing determination as to whether the officer should 
have known that his words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke 
an incriminating response, and therefore should have preceded his 
words or actions with Miranda warnings, as a question of fact). 
Even if the "findings of fact" were actually findings of 
fact, because the trial court did not draft the findings himself, 
but adopted those drafted by counsel, the findings would be entitled 
to less deference on review. See Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. 
Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., 
concurring), cited with approval in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.. 
786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appemdix 1 to this brief contains the full text of: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 (1991 Repl. Vol.) 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 (1991 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (1992) 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV section 1. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. James with one count of burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, section 
76-6-202 (1990 Repl. Vol.)/ and one count of theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404 (1990 Repl. 
Vol.), for events allegedly occurring on March 28, 1991 (R. 7-8). 
After the preliminary hearing the magistrate found probable cause to 
support both charges, and bound the case over to district court (R. 
2-3) . 
The trial court denied Mr. James7 motions to suppress his 
custodial statements to the police (R. 87; 108-109). Mr. James then 
entered a Sery plea to one count of attempted burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-202 (1990 
Repl. Vol.), and Utah Code Ann. section 76-4-101 (1990 Repl. 
Vol.)(R. 114-120). This plea was explicitly conditioned on Mr. 
James7 right to appeal the trial court's denials of the motions to 
suppress under the Utah and Federal Constitutions (R. 114). As part 
of the plea bargain, the State agreed to affirmatively recommend 
sentencing as though the plea were to a class A misdemeanor, and Mr. 
James agreed to pay restitution. 
Judge Rokich sentenced Mr. James on February 10, 1992 to a 
prison term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, and 
ordered him to pay fines and recoupment for his representation (R. 
123). The court then suspended the prison sentence, placing Mr. 
James on probation for three years (R. 124). 
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At the hearing in which Mr. James entered his conditional 
Sery plea, the State agreed that the confession was integral to the 
State's case, and that the State would dismiss the case if the 
court's suppression ruling were reversed (T. 32). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. James was arrested on March 28, 1991, for a burglary 
that occurred that same night (T. 5). The booking sheet indicates 
that Mr. Jam€>s was booked by Officer Kassapakis and searched by 
Officer Cogburn (R. 10). The pretrial sheet indicates charges of 
burglary and theft (R. 9). 
The day after the booking, Detective Newren and Detective 
Cheever, apparently both Caucasian males, one of whom had eleven 
years' experience on the force, and both of whom were apparently 
considerably older than Mr. James, interrogated Mr. James in the old 
booking area of the jail, which is currently used for 
interrogations, not booking (T. 2, R. 93). Mr. James, a Native 
American, was eighteen years old at that time (R. 10). At Detective 
Newren's request, a jailer called Mr. James out of his cell and 
brought him downstairs to the room that used to be the mugshot and 
fingerprinting station, an old room which measures twelve by fifteen 
feet (T. 2-3). Detective Cheever did not direct anyone to inform 
Mr. James as to why he was being taken from his cell to the room 
downstairs (T. 19). The interrogation began at 10:15 a.m. (T. 6). 
The interrogation was not recorded (R. 70). 
Detective Newren first informed Mr. James that the 
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detectives were the detectives investigating the burglary which had 
occurred at 355 North, 700 West, #3 (T. 3, 9). Without informing 
Mr. James of his Miranda rights, the detectives proceeded to 
question Mr. James (T. 9). Detective Newren asked Mr. James his 
name, his date of birth, his birth place, his living arrangements, 
and his job (T. 4). As the pretrial screening sheet reflects, Mr. 
James' "living arrangements" were residence in Apartment #2 at 355 
North, 700 West, which is apparently very near to the scene of the 
burglary and theft (355 North, 700 West, #3)(R. 9). The booking 
sheet reflects that Mr. James was arrested at apartment #2 at this 
location (R. 10). During the evidentiary hearing on the motion to 
suppress, the trial court recognized that the detectives had access 
to the booking sheet prior to their interrogation of Mr. James (T. 
21) . 
Prior to his receipt of Miranda warnings and waiver of 
rights, Mr. James admitted to the burglary (T. 5, 13, 15, R. 27, 70, 
73, 85). 
According to Detective Cheever, at "a point, basically" 
(prosecutor's phrasing), Detective Newren informed Mr. James of his 
Miranda rights (T. 16). Detective Cheever indicated that after the 
first question in the Miranda admonition, Mr. James indicated that 
he understood his rights, and then asked the detectives what would 
happen (T. 17). The detective indicated that he told Mr. James that 
they wanted to get his side of the story and asked him if he would 
give it to them, and that Mr. James said yes (T. 17). Detective 
Cheever then asked, "Having these rights in mind, do you want to 
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talk to us now?", and Mr. James said "Yes." (T. 17). 
Detective Cheever testified that he used no physical force, 
no deception, and no intimidation (T. 17-18). Detective Cheever 
indicated that Mr. James responded in English, appeared to have all 
his faculties, and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs 
(T. 18). Detective Newren opined that Mr. James7 responses to the 
questions were voluntary, and indicated that he did not use any 
force, deception, artifice or measure of intimidation that he was 
aware of (T. 9-10). 
At the preliminary hearing, Detective Cheever testified 
that they informed Mr. James that they were investigating the 
burglary and then proceeded to ask him some "clarifying" questions 
prior to the Miranda warnings, because of the "unusualness" of Mr. 
James' name (Edward James) and date of birth (June 6, 1972)(R. 72). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After a vague oral ruling by the trial court, the State 
drafted findings of fact and conclusions of law, which address 
issues never squarely addressed by the trial court, and which were 
not supported by the detectives' testimony, or by the trial court's 
oral findings following the detectives' testimony. In signing those 
findings over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court 
abdicated his judicial role, and clearly erred. 
Under federal standards recognized in Pennsylvania v Muniz, 
496 U.S. 582 (1990), the detectives should have recorded the 
interrogation, and owed Mr. James Miranda warnings at the outset of 
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the interrogation. The coercive and improper circumstances of the 
interrogation require the suppression of all of Mr. James' 
statements, under principles recognized in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298 (1985). 
Under the Utah Constitution, the detectives should have 
recorded the interrogation, informed Mr. James of his Miranda rights 
at the outset of the interrogation, and honored those rights. 
Suppression is the appropriate remedy. The Elstad case is 
inconsistent with prior Utah Constitutional caselaw, and this Court 
should reject it on state constitutional grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
IN FAILING TO ARTICULATE HIS RULING 
AND IN SIGNING THE STATE'S FINDINGS OF FACT, 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR. 
To the extent that this Court needs to refer to the trial 
court's analysis,1 it is important to note that the trial court's 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law are incongruent with 
the trial court's oral findings,2 and with the evidence. After 
1. See Sampson, supra at 1 (when facts are undisputed, 
Court reviews legal conclusions, even those couched as "findings," 
for correctness). 
2. Reference to oral rulings outside the written findings 
of fact and conclusions of law is proper practice. See e.g. Erwin 
v. Erwin. 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1989)("In assessing the 
sufficiency of the findings [in a domestic bench trial], ... we are 
not confined to the contents of a particular document entitled 
"Findings"; rather, the findings may be expressed orally from the 
bench or contained in other documents, such as the quite thorough 
memorandum decision of the trial court in this case.")(footnotes, 
citing inter alia Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), omitted). 
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discussing the legal inadequacy of the written findings and 
conclusions, Mr. James will marshall the evidence. 
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the 
trial court rejected the State's argument that the police were 
attempting to ascertain Mr. James7 identity at the outset of the 
interrogation, finding that the detectives already had access to all 
of the identification information on the booking sheet, and that the 
detectives' purpose was to obtain a confession (T. 19-22). The 
trial court took the motion under advisement, indicating the court's 
inclination to suppress the statements, but waiting to rule until 
after the court reviewed the cases presented by the State in 
opposition to suppression, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 
(1990), and Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (R. 24-33).3 
A copy of the trial court's oral findings at this hearing 
is in Appendix 2. 
At the next hearing, the court announced that despite the 
court's discomfort with the ruling, the case was controlled by the 
State's "cases.11 The trial court felt that the police should have 
given Mr. James his Miranda warnings before the interrogation, but 
3. As is discussed more fully infra, the minority Muniz 
opinion recognized an exception to the Miranda doctrine, allowing 
police to ask "routine booking questions" without informing a 
suspect of his Miranda rights. The majority of the court either did 
not reach or rejected the "routine booking questions" exception. 
Elstad. discussed infra, indicates that statements taken after the 
receipt and waiver of Miranda warnings are not necessarily tainted 
by prior statements taken in violation of Miranda. 
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indicated Mr. James' "statement" was voluntary and admissible (T.2 
1-2). The court indicated that he would write a memorandum opinion 
(T.2 2), but simply signed the findings and conclusions prepared by 
the State without any further articulation of the court's own ruling. 
The trial court's oral ruling at the second hearing is 
unclear in two respects. First, the ruling does not indicate which 
of the State's cases justify the admission of the evidence. If the 
court was relying on Elstad and Bishop,4 as it appears from the 
ruling at the second hearing (T.2 1), the court recognized a Miranda 
violation, and did not intend to justify the interrogation under the 
Muniz routine booking questions exception to Miranda. However, it 
is possible that the court was relying on Elstad and the minority 
Muniz opinion, the opinions asserted most vigorously by the State at 
the first hearing, and thus recognized no Miranda violation. 
Second, the ruling is unclear as to what "statement" of Mr. James is 
admissible. If the court was ruling under the Muniz minority 
opinion and Elstad, it appears that the court intended for both the 
pre- and post-Miranda statements to be admissible. If the court was 
ruling under Elstad and Bishop, it appears that the court intended 
for only the post-Miranda statements to be admissible. 
A copy of the trial court's ruling at this hearing is in 
Appendix 3. 
4. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), discusses the 
Elstad case, id, 753 P.2d at 465-66, but has nothing to do with the 
Muniz minority's routine booking questions exception to Miranda. 
See supra n.3. 
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Over the written objections of defense counsel (R. 81-83), 
the trial court signed the State's findings and conclusions, which 
indicate that police have no obligation to inform a suspect of his 
rights under the Miranda decision during routine booking 
questioning, that the detectives in this case were merely seeking to 
establish Mr. James' identity and did not owe him Miranda warnings 
prior to his admission, and that if the pre-Miranda statements were 
suppressible, there is no constitutional requirement of suppression 
of the post-Miranda statements (R. 84-87). A copy of the findings 
and conclusions is in Appendix 4. 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),5 it is the duty 
of the trial courts to find the facts necessary to the courts' 
decisions.6 This Court has previously articulated the trial courts' 
fact finding duties, explaining, 
This court requires that findings of fact 
(1) include enough facts to disclose the process 
through which the ultimate conclusion is reached, 
(2) indicate that the process is logical and 
properly supported, and (3) not be clearly 
erroneous. 
Hardv v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 923 (Utah App. 1989). 
5. The rule applies in criminal cases. State v. Goodman, 
763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 1988). 
6. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) also requires, 
A motion made before trial shall be determined 
before trial unless the court for good cause 
orders that the ruling be deferred for later 
determination. Where factual issues are involved 
in determining a motion, the court shall state 
its findings on the record. 
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In Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989), Justice Zimmerman wrote a concurring opinion 
which is cited with approval in the unanimous State v. Rio Vista 
Oil. Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990), case. His concurring 
Automatic Control opinion indicates that trial courts must 
articulate the bases for their rulings, and that they must closely 
scrutinize findings drafted by counsel. Id at 1261-1262. His 
opinion further indicates that reviewing courts pay counsel-drafted 
findings less deference than those drafted by courts. Id. The 
opinion states, 
The findings of facts "is an important part 
of the judicial function," one that is designed 
to flesh out the rationale for the decision and 
one that "the judge cannot surrender ... to 
counsel." As the United States Supreme Court has 
noted, findings of fact prepared by the court are 
"drawn with the insight of a disinterested mind" 
and are "more helpful to the appellate court" and 
are "more helpful to the appellate court" than 
those prepared by counsel. It is for this reason 
that the federal courts appear to have almost 
uniformly adopted the rule that while findings 
prepared by counsel are sufficient under the 
federal analogue to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
52, appellate courts "will feel freer in close 
cases to disregard a finding or remand for 
further findings if the trial court did not 
prepare them him [or her] self." 
I know that I apply a similar standard in 
reviewing findings prepared by counsel, and I 
suspect that other members of the Court do the 
same, although to my knowledge, we have never 
said so. In light of this fact and the rule 
stated above, trial courts would be well advised 
to be vigilant in guarding against the tendency 
to view findings as a detail to be dealt with as 
expeditiously as possible, rather than as a 
fundamental part of the decisional process, one 
that goes to the heart of its integrity. In the 
same vein, counsel preparing proposed findings 
and conclusions should be cautious lest in their 
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zeal, they inc[l]ude proposals that may undermine 
the integrity of the judgment they hope to obtain. 
Id at 1261-1262. 
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 
(1964), the Court quoted Judge Skelly Wright of the D. C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, as follows: 
"I suggest to you [trial courts] strongly 
that you avoid as far as you possibly can simply 
signing what some lawyer puts under your nose. 
These lawyers, and properly so, in their zeal and 
advocacy and their enthusiasm are going to state 
the case for their side in these findings as 
strongly as they possibly can. When these 
findings get to the courts of appeals they won't 
be worth the paper they are written on as far as 
assisting the court of appeals in determining why 
the judge decided the case." Seminars for Newly 
Appointed United States District Judges (1963), 
p. 166. 
U. S. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.. 376 U.S. 651, 656 n.4 (1964). 
In the instant case, in failing to adequately articulate 
his ruling, cind in signing the State's findings and conclusions 
which conflicted with the court's oral findings and reached issues 
never previously addressed by the trial court, the trial court 
abdicated his judicial responsibilities, discussed above. 
The key disparity between the court's oral findings and 
those drafted by the State is that the trial court stated on the 
record at the evidentiary hearing that the police were not seeking 
to verify Mr. James' identity at the outset of the interrogation 
when the police already had the identification information on the 
booking sheet, but were seeking to obtain a confession (T. 19-22), 
while the written findings indicate that "[t]he detectives then 
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asked the defendant general questions about his identity for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether the correct person was being 
interviewed." (R. 85). The distinction is key to whether a Miranda 
violation occurred under federal standards, discussed infra. In 
justifying the admission of the evidence under the routine booking 
question doctrine, the findings rely on a doctrine that has not been 
adopted by a majority of the United States Supreme Court, and 
address an issue that was inconsistent with the trial court's 
factual findings at the evidentiary hearing, and never squarely 
addressed by the court thereafter. 
Because the trial court abdicated his judicial 
responsibilities in signing the findings submitted by counsel, this 
Court owes no deference to the written findings. Cjf. El Paso 
Natural Gas, supra. The only true factual finding made by the trial 
court, to which this Court should defer, is the trial court's oral 
finding that when the detectives began the interrogation of Mr. 
James, it was their purpose to obtain a confession, rather than to 
obtain the identification information which the detectives already 
had (T. 19-22). 
As a general rule, "[a]n appellant raising issues of fact 
on appeal must, under Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshall all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, and show that evidence to be 
insufficient." State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 
1991). Because the facts in this case are undisputed, allowing a 
correction of error analysis under Sampson, supra at 1, and because 
the trial court's written findings of fact are legally inadequate, 
-13-
it appears that marshalling the evidence may be unnecessary in this 
case.7 However, marshalling the evidence does demonstrate clear 
errors in the trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. 
The court's written conclusions indicate that the 
detectives were "merely requesting biographical data to assure the 
interviewing detectives that they were about to question the right 
suspect." (R. 87). The trial court's oral conclusions indicate that 
the detectives' purpose when they questioned Mr. James was not to 
verify Mr. James' identity, but was to obtain a confession (T. 20, 
21) . 
The evidence squares with the trial court's oral findings 
7. In Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991), 
this Court explained, 
"The process of marshaling the evidence 
serves the important function of reminding 
litigants and appellate courts of the broad 
deference owed to the fact finder at trial." 
How€*ver, we will only grant this deference when 
the findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to 
disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's 
decision. There is, in effect, no need for an 
appellant to marshal the evidence when the 
findings are so inadequate that they cannot be 
meaningfully challenged as factual 
determinations. In other words, the way to 
attack findings which appear to be complete and 
which are sufficiently detailed is to marshal the 
supporting evidence and then demonstrate the 
evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. 
But where the findings are not of that caliber, 
appellant need not go through a futile 
marshalling exercise. Rather, appellant can 
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the 
court's findings as framed. 
Id. at 477-478 (citations omitted). 
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that the detectives were not attempting to verify Mr. James7 
identity at the outset of the interview, but were interrogating him 
to get a confession. Detective Newren indicated that the detectives 
began the interview by informing Mr. James that they were there to 
investigate the burglary at 355 North on 700 West #3 (T. 3), the 
apartment which is apparently near to the apartment listed as Mr. 
James' residence on the pretrial screening sheet, 355 North 700 
West, #2 (R. 9). He indicated that it was his intention to ask Mr. 
James about the burglary (T. 7). He never testified that the 
questions at the outset of the interview, including Mr. James' 
"living arrangements" were posed to verify Mr. James' identity. 
Detective Cheever testified that Mr. James was informed that they 
were in the interview room to investigate the burglary (T. 12). 
Detective Cheever never testified that the questions at the outset 
of the interview were posed to verify Mr. James' identity. 
A portion of the preliminary hearing transcript was in the 
district court pleadings file, and the trial court had read it (T. 
8). In this transcript, Detective Newren testified that prior to 
the Miranda warnings the detectives asked Mr. James some 
"identification" questions (R. 70), and then indicated that the 
questions were "[c]larifying his name and different things like 
that, because of the unusualness of the Edward and the James and 
date of birth." (R. 72). There is nothing unusual about Edward 
James7 name and date of birth. If the detectives were really 
clarifying these "unusual" facts, there would have been no need for 
their additional questions about his current living arrangements, 
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his jobf his employment, and what he did for a living (R. 73). Even 
if this testimony were true, that the detectives were clarifying Mr. 
James unusual name and birthdate, it does not support the trial 
court's written finding that "[t]he detectives then asked the 
defendant general questions about his identity for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether the correct person was being interviewed." (R. 
85)(emphasis added). 
The trial court's oral findings that the detectives were 
interrogating Mr. James with the intent to obtain a confession, 
rather than seeking to verify his identity, were correct. The 
written "finding" to the contrary is without any evidentiary support 
and clearly erroneous. 
The trial court's written findings include the following 
version of the admissions, "Detective Cheever questioned the 
defendant about his present employment to which the defendant 
responded that he was presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, 
volunteered that during times when he was unemployed was when he got 
into trouble, that this is when he gets things into his head and 
does them, and admitted to the burglary." (R. 85)(emphasis added). 
There is nothing in evidence to support the emphasized 
portion of this version of events. According to Detective Cheever, 
Mr. James indicated that he was not working, and then said "at that 
point that he got the idea in his head and that he did it, he went 
into a neighbor's house and took a coat and stereo, and they found 
it." (T. 15). At the preliminary hearing, relevant portions of 
which transcript were presented in the district court file, 
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Detective Newren testified that it was after the detectives asked 
Mr. James about the burglary that he stated that he "sometimes gets 
things in his head and that he had done the burglary and gone 
through the window." (R. 70). On cross-examination at the 
preliminary hearing, Detective Newren said that the admission came 
after Detective Cheever asked Mr. James about what he does for a 
living (R. 73). It appears that the quotation included in the 
findings and conclusions comes from Detective Newren's police 
report, which was not placed in evidence, but which was provided to 
defense counsel in discovery. Regardless of the source of the 
quotation, it is not supported by the evidence, and the finding 
including the quotation is clearly erroneous. 
The last written "finding" (which is really a legal 
conclusion) is also clearly erroneous. It states, "No coercion or 
deception of any kind was exercised by the Detectives in order to 
induce the defendant to speak with the police." (R. 86). On the 
contrary. As is discussed infra, numerous facts before the trial 
court demonstrate the coercive tactics employed by the detectives, 
including the incommunicado, unrecorded interrogation occurring in 
the small, old booking room at the jail, wherein two older and 
experienced Caucasian detectives questioned a young Native American, 
without giving him timely Miranda warnings. "[C]ustodial 
interrogation is inherently coercive." State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 
1100, 1103 n.6 (citing Miranda). 
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Under the governing law, the trial court's findings are 
clearly erroneous and should be reversed. State v. Jackson. 805 
P.2d 765, 766 (Utah App. 1990)("A finding is clearly erroneous if it 
is without adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an 
erroneous view of the law.); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 
(Utah App. 1990)("The trial court's factual determinations are 
clearly erroneous only if in conflict with the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if this court has a 'definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made./n)(citations omitted); State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990)(to withstand appellate review, trial 
court's finding of fact must be supported by substantial, competent 
evidence; prosecutor's argument does not constitute evidence to 
support a finding). 
II. 
MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED 
AS A MATTER OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself[.]" 
As a common law protection of the exercise of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, the United States 
Supreme Court set forth some general guidelines in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Under Miranda, if the State wishes to 
present in evidence statements which stem from custodial 
interrogation, the State bears a "heavy" burden to show that prior 
to the statements, the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, 
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and made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights 
before making the statement in issue. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
444-445. The Court designated the following information to be given 
to the person prior to custodial interrogation: "that he has a right 
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444. 
It is the State's burden to show, by at least a 
preponderance of the evidence, that confessions are voluntary under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State 
v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988). The defendant is entitled 
to a "reliable and clear-cut" determination as to whether the 
confession was voluntary under the totality of circumstances. Id. 
(citation omitted). Voluntariness is a question of law, involving 
this Court's assessment of the "characteristics of the accused and 
the details of the interrogation." State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303, 
1309-1320 (Utah App. 1991)(citations omitted). Coercive tactics of 
government agents are key to the analysis. Id. at 1310-1311. 
Statements taken in violation of Miranda are not ordinarily 
presumed to taint subsequent statements obtained after Miranda 
warnings, if the pre-Miranda statements were not otherwise coerced. 
Oregon V. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985). 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in part, "No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
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of the laws." The Fourteenth Amendment requires suppression of 
confessions obtained through police misconduct. The due process 
aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment claim is explained in Spano v. 
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), as follows: 
The abhorrence of society to the use of 
involuntary confessions does not turn alone on 
their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns 
on the deeprooted feeling that the police must 
obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the 
end life and liberty can be as much endangered 
from illegal methods used to convict those 
thought to be criminals as from the actual 
criminals themselves. 
Id. at 321. See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-11 
(1985)(confessions admitted in state and federal courts must be 
voluntary under the Fourteenth Amendment, must have been obtained by 
government compliance with due process). 
A. THE DETECTIVES SHOULD HAVE RECORDED THE INTERROGATION. 
It is the duty of the courts to insure that custodial 
interrogation is legal, and absent an adequate record, the courts 
are in no position to fulfill this duty. See State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Utah 1988)(M/[I]t is the duty of an appellate 
court . . . 'to examine the entire record and make and independent 
determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.'")(citations 
omitted). When the record of custodial interrogations is 
inadequate, the State is responsible. 
The Miranda Court explained why the burden is on the State 
to show that the Miranda rights are given and waived in a knowing 
and voluntary manner, stating, 
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If the interrogation continues without the 
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, 
a heavy burden rests on the government to 
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his privilege against 
self-incrimination and his right to retained or 
appointed counsel. This Court has always set 
high standards of proof for the waiver of 
constitutional rights, and we re-assert these 
standards as applied to in-custody 
interrogation. Since the State is responsible 
for establishing the isolated circumstances under 
which the interrogation takes place and has the 
only means of making available corroborated 
evidence of warnings given during incommunicado 
interrogation, the burden is rightly on its 
shoulders. 
Miranda. 384 U.S. at 475 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
As is explained below, in circumstances wherein the police 
unjustifiably fail to record incommunicado interrogations and 
present an unclear picture as to the circumstances of the 
interrogations, the State cannot meet its "heavy" burden of proof in 
demonstrating the receipt and waiver of Miranda rights, or of 
proving by at least a preponderance of the evidence that the 
statements were given voluntarily. Due process requires suppression 
of such statements allegedly made but not recorded. 
In State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that when the State presents supposed 
confessions without an adequate means of recording them, courts are 
not in a position to assess whether the defendant's rights have been 
violated or protected. Carter, 776 P.2d at 891. 
In Carter, the defendant's confession was dictated by a 
police officer, who stopped every few lines for the defendant's 
approval, and later obtained the defendant's signature on the 
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confession. The police obtained a written waiver of the defendant's 
Miranda rights prior to the confession. The court rejected Mr. 
Carter's claims that the manner of recording his confession denied 
him his rights, relying, in part, on the fact that the defendant had 
made two incriminating statements to other witnesses which 
substantially parallelled the confession. Id. at 890. 
Before leaving this issue, however, the court explained 
that police are responsible to provide reliable proof of the 
circumstances surrounding custodial interrogations, stating, 
While we hold that admission of the 
confession was not prejudicial error, we do not 
sanction the particular manner in which it was 
recorded in this case. In Bishop, that 
defendant's confession, togsither with statements 
made by the police officers, was recorded 
verbatim. This process not only helped insure 
that the defendant's confession was not coerced, 
but also provided both the trial court and this 
court with the correct tools for effectively and 
efficiently reviewing the defendant's 
contentions, as well as the totality of the 
circumstances of his confession. Such a process 
guarantees that constitutional rights are 
protected and justice is effected. Nevertheless, 
while the dictation process that occurred in this 
case could conceivably amount, in other 
instances, to deprivation of a defendant's 
constitutional rights, that was not the case here. 
Id. at 891. 
The record contains no explanation for why the detectives 
chose not to record the interrogation of Mr. James. The record 
demonstrates that the detectives are not reliable sources for the 
fact sensitive analyses required in assessing Mr. James' 
statements. For instance, the record contains several different 
versions of Mr. James' first incriminating statement and the 
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circumstances in which it was made, all of which versions were 
provided by the two detectives who initiated the interrogation and 
chose not to record it. According to Detective Cheever, Mr. James 
indicated that he was not working, and then said "at that point that 
he got the idea in his head and that he did it, he went into a 
neighbor's house and took a coat and stereo, and they found it." (T. 
15). However, at the preliminary hearing, Detective Newren 
testified that it was after the detectives asked Mr. James about the 
burglary that he stated that he "sometimes gets things in his head 
and that he had done the burglary and gone through the window." (R. 
70). On cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, Detective 
Newren said that the admission came after Detective Cheever asked 
Mr. James about what he does for a living (R. 73). The State's 
memorandum indicates, "In regard to Detective Cheever asking the 
defendant about his employment, the defendant stated he was not 
working at the time, then paused, and added, 'that this is when he 
got into trouble,' ... 'at such times, he gets things into his head 
and does them" and admitted to the burglary.'" (R. 27)(emphasis 
added). This same version appears in the the trial court's 
post-hearing written findings (R. 85). It appears that this 
quotation comes from Detective Newren's police report, which was not 
placed in evidence, but which was provided to defense counsel in 
discovery. 
The detectives' inability to establish this most critical 
piece of evidence for their own case counsels against relying on 
these detectives for proof that they respected Mr. James' rights. 
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See Shiflet v. State, 752 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985)("[0]ral 
confessions of guilt, or oral admissions against interest, made by 
one in custody are inadmissible evidence because they are so liable 
to be misunderstood, so easily fabricated, and so hard to be 
contradicted.11) (citations omitted) . 
The Miranda and Carter decisions have been around long 
enough for the detectives to have known that they had the obligation 
to make a reliable record of any supposed confession obtained 
through this isolated interrogation of this young Native American. 
The detectives' failure to record the interrogation demonstrates 
police misconduct, in violation of Mr. James' right to due process 
of law. See Spano, supra. The detectives' failure to record the 
interrogation has resulted in an unreliable record for judicial 
review of the legality of the circumstances of the custodial 
interrogation, and demonstrates that the State has failed to carry 
its burden to demonstrate that Mr. James' made a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, and gave his statements 
voluntarily. In these circumstances, suppression is appropriate. 
See Miranda. Carter. Bishop. Shiflet. and Spano. supra. See also 
Morris v. State. 603 P.2d 1157, 1158-1160 (Okl. Cr. 1979)(unrecorded 
confession should have been suppressed because record of 
circumstances reflected violation of defendant's rights, and 
apparently because of blatant government misconduct in failing to 
adequately record and produce a record of the circumstances of the 
confession). 
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B. UNDER MUNIZ. THE DETECTIVES OWED MR. JAMES A MIRANDA WARNING, AND 
SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT A WAIVER OF MR. JAMES7 RIGHTS AT THE OUTSET OF 
THE INTERROGATION. 
Under federal law, Miranda warnings are required prior to 
"custodial interrogation." State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1104. 
The State conceded in the trial court that Mr. James was in 
custody (R. 30). It appears that the State may have conceded that 
Mr. James was subjected to "interrogation," during the argument at 
the hearing on the motion to suppress under the federal 
constitution, when the prosecutor stated, 
The issue in this case is whether or not there 
was interrogation. The issue in this case is 
Miranda. The issue in this case is neither 
custody nor interrogation. The issue in this 
case is whether the delayed Miranda admonition 
rendered the post-Miranda Statement involuntary. 
(T. 27). 
The court's written conclusions indicate indirectly that 
Mr. James was in custody (R. 86), but appear to indicate that Mr. 
James was not subjected to interrogation when the detectives were 
"merely requesting biographical data to assure the interviewing 
detectives that they were about to question the right suspect." (R. 
87). The conclusions also indicate, "The police are not required to 
give Miranda admonitions to a defendant who is in custody prior to 
asking routine booking questions which the police have no reason to 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." 
(R. 86-87. However, the conclusions vacillate as to whether 
interrogation occurred, indicating, "even if the unwarned statements 
resulted from interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, there is 
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no constitutional requirement that this Court suppress the 
defendant's post-Miranda statements."1 (R. 87). 
As previously noted, these written conclusions conflict 
with the trial court's oral ruling and clear evidence that the 
police were not seeking to verify Mr* James7 identity, but were 
seeking a confession. 
The trial court's legal conclusions are incorrect as a 
matter of law, as well. Under federal law, there are two separate 
ways to establish "interrogation." First, express (questioning 
constitutes interrogation. Second, words or actions that the police 
should know would reasonably lead to incriminating responses 
constitute a "functional equivalent" of interrogation. E.g. Rhode 
Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980); Pennsylvania v. 
Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600-01 (1990)(plurality); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 
U.S. 520, 526 (1987).8 The trial court's conclusions overlook the 
fact that the express questions in this case constitute actual 
interrogation, and do not require analysis of whether the police had 
reason to know they would elicit an incriminating response, the 
functional equivalent of interrogation inquiry. 
8. In Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 
1991), the Court listed federal circuit court opinions for the 
proposition that "an express question from police to a suspect does 
not amount to interrogation if, under the circumstances, the 
question was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response." JId. at 1215. These cases, like the trial court in the 
instant case, improperly confuse the two separate ways of showing 
interrogation: 1) express questioning (actual interrogation), or 2) 
words or actions that an officer should know are reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response (functional equivalent of 
interrogation). See Muniz, Mauro, Innis, supra. 
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Even if the functional equivalent of interrogation 
definition were applicable to the direct questions asked in this 
case, the questions would constitute interrogation. At the time of 
the interrogation in this case, Mr. James was in custody in the 
jail, facing charges of burglary and theft, which charges were the 
subject of the detectives' interrogation. The detectives had him 
brought to an isolated area in the jail, announced that they were 
investigating the burglary at 355 North 700 West #3, and proceeded 
to ask him questions. In this case, where Mr. James was accused of 
committing a burglary and theft at 355 North 700 West #3, his 
revelation of information such as his "current living arrangements" 
at 355 North 700 West #2 (R. 9, the pretrial services screening 
sheet reflecting this as his address, R. 10, the booking sheet 
reflecting this as the location of Mr. James' arrest), was 
incriminating. The detectives should have known that their words 
and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. See Lavton City v. Aracron, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 
1991)("The likelihood of incrimination must be determined from all 
of the circumstances; the same question may constitute interrogation 
in one situation but not in another. For example, in United States 
v. Poole. 794 F.2d 462, 466-67, amended in 806 F.2d 853 (9th 
Cir.1986), the court noted that asking for name, date of birth, and 
similar routine biographical data is ordinarily not an 
interrogation, but it was interrogation when asked immediately after 
showing a bank robbery suspect surveillance photos of the robbery 
and mentioning his accomplice by name."). 
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The trial court's written conclusions indicating that 
police have no obligation to inform suspects of their Miranda rights 
prior to asking them routine booking questions or questions about 
biographical data, are apparently conclusions drawn from Justice 
Brennan's minority opinion in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 
(1990). Justice Marshall persuasively rejected the "routine booking 
questions" exception, 496 U.S. 608-626, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
and Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens did not reach the question, 
496 U.S. 606-608. The State apparently overlooked the fact that the 
"routine booking questions" exception was not adopted by a majority 
of the Court in Muniz, for the State cited Muniz in arguing to the 
trial court as follows: "However, the United States Supreme Court 
has recently affirmed the 'routine booking question' exception which 
exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the biographical 
data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services." (R. 30). 
The State's courtesy copy of Muniz in the district court file 
contains the full minority opinion, and the full concurring opinion, 
but omits Justice Marshall's dissenting and concurring opinion. 
Even if Muniz were a majority opinion, it would not apply 
to the facts of this case, where the detectives were not booking Mr. 
James or fulfilling some other administrative duty, but were seeking 
a confession to the crime that they were investigating, and were 
asking questions that were incriminating. For example, the 
detectives informed Mr. James that they were there to investigate 
the burglary that occurred at 355 North 700 West, Apartment #3 (T. 
3), and then asked him what his "living arrangements" were (T. 4), 
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when the pretrial services screening sheet and booking sheet already 
indicated that Mr. James lived in and was arrested in apartment #2 
at that very address of the crime that the detectives were 
investigating (R. 9, 10). As the trial court originally concluded, 
the officers already had the identification information available to 
them on the booking sheet, and were seeking a confession (T. 
19-22). In these circumstances, the "routine booking questions" 
exception would not apply. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02 and n.14 
(to qualify under "routine booking questions" exception, questions 
must be reasonably related to administrative duties such as booking 
and pretrial services screening; designedly incriminating booking 
questions require Miranda warnings). 
In directly questioning Mr. James while he was in custody 
for charges of burglary and theft, the detectives conducted 
custodial interrogation, which should have been preceded by a 
Miranda warning and waiver of rights. The detectives' duty to 
inform Mr. James of his Miranda rights at the outset of the 
interrogation is reinforced by the fact that the officers should 
have known that their words and actions were reasonably likely to 
elicit incriminating responses from Mr. James. The detectives' 
failure to give the Miranda warnings in a timely fashion calls for 
suppression of the pre-Miranda statements. Miranda. 
C. THE COERCIVE AND IMPROPER NATURE OF THE INTERROGATION REQUIRES 
THE SUPPRESSION OF ALL OF MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS UNDER PRINCIPLES 
RECOGNIZED IN THE ELSTAD OPINION. 
The trial court7s findings and conclusions indicate that 
-29-
there was no coercion involved in the interrogation of Mr, James, 
and that his statements to the detectives were all voluntary (R. 
86) . The conclusions indicate that even if Mr. James' pre-Miranda 
statements were taken in violation of Mr. James' Miranda rights, 
"there is no constitutional requirement that this Court suppress the 
defendant's post-Miranda statements." (R. 87). The trial court's 
conclusion is apparently based on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 
(1985), the case most consistently asserted by the State (e.g. R. 
41-46). 
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court held, 
[A] suspect who has once responded to unwarned 
yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby 
disabled from waiving his rights and confessing 
after he has been given the requisite Miranda 
warnings. 
Id, at 318. The Court indicated further, 
[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper 
tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the 
mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned 
admission does not warrant a presumption of 
compulsion. A subsequent administration of 
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a 
voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily 
should suffice to remove the conditions that 
precluded admission of the earlier statement. In 
such circumstances, the finder of fact may 
reasonably conclude that the suspect made a 
rational and intelligent choice whether to waive 
or invoke his rights. 
Id. at 314. 
The Elstad case turned on unique facts, which led the Court 
to conclude that the unwarned statements made by Mr. Elstad were not 
otherwise coerced. The Court explained, 
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It is also beyond dispute that respondent's 
earlier remark was voluntary, within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment. Neither the environment 
nor the manner of either "interrogation" was 
coercive. The initial conversation took place at 
midday, in the living room area of respondent's 
own home, with his mother in the kitchen area, a 
few steps away. Although in retrospect the 
officers testified that respondent was then in 
custody, at the time he made his statement he had 
not been informed that he was under arrest. The 
arresting officers' testimony indicates that the 
brief stop in the living room before proceeding 
to the station house was not to interrogate the 
suspect but to notify his mother of the reason 
for his arrest. 
Id. at 315. The Court noted the Miranda violation at issue was one 
conceded by the government, and thus one that the Court was 
constrained to assume, jld. at 315, but indicated that the police 
failure to give Miranda warnings may have been an innocent mistake, 
and also noted that the police did not exploit the pre-Miranda 
statement when they later obtained Mr. Elstad's waiver of his rights 
at the police station, about an hour after his initial statement 
made at Mr. Elstad's home. Id. The Court noted that Mr. Elstad may 
have been prompted to waive his rights and again confess at the 
station, by his father's accosting him on the way from his home to 
the police station. Id. at 314. Mr. Elstad's waiver of his Miranda 
rights was recorded by the police contemporaneously, id. at 315-16, 
and he was also given a typewritten copy of his second confession to 
modify and sign after the interrogation, .id. at 301-02. 
The Elstad Court's holding is tied in closely with the 
facts of the case, and the opinion reiterates that each case must 
turn on its own facts, stating, 
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When police ask questions of a suspect in 
custody without administering the required 
warnings, Miranda dictates that the answers 
received be presumed compelled and that they be 
excluded from evidence at trial in the State's 
case in chief. . . . We do not imply that good 
faith excuses a failure to administer Miranda 
warnings; nor do we condone inherently coercive 
police tactics or methods offensive to due 
process that render the initial admission 
involuntary and undermine the suspect's will to 
invoke his rights once they are read to him. A 
handful of courts have, however, applied our 
precedents relating to confessions obtained under 
coercive circumstances to situations involving 
wholly voluntary admissions, requiring a passage 
of time or break in events before a second, fully 
warned statement can be deemed voluntary. Far 
from establishing a rigid rule, we direct courts 
to avoid one; there is no warrant for presuming 
coercive effect where the suspect's initial 
inculpatory statement, though technically in 
violation of Miranda, was voluntary. The 
relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second 
statement was also voluntarily made. As in any 
such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine the 
surrounding circumstances and the entire course 
of police conduct with respect to the suspect in 
evaluating the voluntariness of his statements. 
Id. at 317-318. 
The trial court's conclusion that Mr. James' statements 
were voluntary was based on the conclusory testimony of the 
detectives to this effect. The conclusion states, 
Based on the uncontradicted testimony of the 
Detectives who conducted the interview that the 
defendant freely volunteered the information 
requested and was subjected to neither coercion, 
physical or psychological, or induced to speak as 
a result of promises or deception of any kind, 
the Court concludes the defendant's statements 




The trial court's conclusion is incorrect, in that it 
relies solely on the conclusory testimony of the officers concerning 
what occurred during the secluded and unrecorded interrogation, and 
fails to apply well established legal precedents which demonstrate 
the coercive nature of the interrogation. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 
U.S. 104, 117 (1985)(part of the reason that the voluntariness 
question is a question of law, and subject to correction on appeal 
without deference to the fact finder(s), is that the actual facts 
involved are frequently not truly ascertainable; "critical events 
surrounding the taking of a confession almost invariably occur in a 
secret and inherently more coercive environment" than prevails in 
open court on the record). Defense counsel correctly argued to the 
trial court that the voluntariness question was a conclusion to be 
reached independently by the trial court, not the detectives (T. 9). 
In assessing the voluntariness of confessions under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has 
applied a "totality of the circumstances" test, considering the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation, 
including such criteria as the youth of the accused, and the lack of 
advice to the accused concerning his rights. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-227 (1973). 
Numerous courts have recognized that "custodial 
interrogation is inherently coercive." State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 
1100, 1103 n.6 (citing Miranda). See also State v. Miller. 829 P.2d 
132, 134 (Utah App. 1992)("[C]onfinement in jail provides a suspect 
setting for coercive interrogations.")(citation omitted). 
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When people such as Mr. Jamets are interrogated in the jail, 
in isolated rooms without witnesses or recording devices, they are 
at the mercy of the detectives and they know it. The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that those subject to incommunicado 
custodial interrogation are often aware that the interrogation will 
continue until the detectives obtain the information they want, and 
are often fearful that, due to the isolation of the interrogation, 
they are in danger of abuse from the detectives. Berkerner v. 
Mccarty. 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 (1984). See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
461 ("As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated 
setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or 
other officieil investigations, where there are often impartial 
observers to guard against intimidation or trickery."). 
The detectives in this case had Mr. James brought to an 
isolated and small room in the jail where the two of them 
immediately confronted him with the fact that they were there to 
investigate the burglary with which Mr. James had been charged. The 
fact that there were two of them demonstrates coercion. Ashcraft v. 
Tennessee. 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Spano v. New York. 360 U.S. 315 
(1959) . The fact that they isolated Mr. James from his family and 
friends, and from attorneys demonstrates coercion. Mincey v. 
Arizona. 437 U.S. 385 (1978), Mr. James7 youth also demonstrates 
coercion. Schneckcloth. supra. 
Mr. James was undoubtedly aware that, in the isolated 
circumstances of the interrogation, with no recording device in use, 
whatever was to happen in the old booking area of the jail with the 
-34-
two detectives would occur without witnesses. The absence of a tape 
recorder or any effort to record the events in the basement of the 
jail must have heightened the coercive effect of the incommunicado 
interrogation. The fact that the detectives chose to disobey State 
v. Carter's clear mandate to record the interrogation demonstrates 
coercion. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)(coercion 
is demonstrated through police disregard of applicable law). 
Finally, the fact that the detectives conducted custodial 
interrogation without giving Mr. James timely Miranda warnings, and 
the fact that one of them later claimed that their interrogation was 
just "clarification" of Mr. James7 "unusual" name and birthdate, 
demonstrate coercion. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); 
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 465 (Utah 1988). 
Under Elstad, Mr. James' involuntary pre-Miranda statements 
are relevant to the voluntariness of the purported Miranda waiver, 
and the post-Miranda confession. The Court indicated that in cases 
where unwarned statements are not only presumptively compelled by 
virtue of police failure to give timely Miranda warnings, but are 
also involuntary or products of police misbehavior, courts must 
determine whether intervening events demonstrate that subsequent 
Miranda waivers and statements are voluntary, and not the product of 
the original involuntary statements. In the words of the Court, 
When a prior statement is actually coerced, the 
time that passes between confessions, the change 
in place of interrogations, and the change in 
identity of the interrogators all bear on whether 
that coercion has carried over into the second 
confession. 
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Elstad at 310. 
In the instant case, the purported Miranda waiver and the 
second confession followed directly after the coerced admissions. 
There was nothing separating the the coerced admissions from the 
waiver and subsequent confession. The admissions combine with the 
coercive factors prevailing throughout the interrogation to 
demonstrate that the purported Miranda waiver and subsequent 
confession were involuntary. Under Elstad, the pre- and 
post-Miranda statements made by Mr. James to the police must be 
suppressed. See also Miranda at and 475 and 476 (government bears 
"heavy" burden to demonstrate knowing and voluntary waiver; "any 
evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a 
waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily 
waive his privilege."); State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 
1989)("Once the accused has been so advised, he has the privilege of 
waiving these; rights but must do so voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently. This is generally acknowledged as meaning that the 
waiver must have been the product of a "free and deliberate choice 
rather than intimidation, coercion or deception" and executed with 
"full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and 
[of] the consequences of the decision to abandon it.")(citations 
omitted); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah App. 
1990)("Initially we note that, though a defendant may waive his 
rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during 
custodial interrogation, 'these waivers must be both intentional and 
made with full knowledge of the consequences and the defendant is 
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given the benefit of every reasonable presumption against such a 
waiver.")(citations omitted). 
III. 
MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS 
SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IN THIS CASE. 
Defense counsel submitted a motion and memorandum arguing 
that the confession should be suppressed under the Utah Constitution 
(R. 92-101). At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel 
discussed various Utah cases decided under the Utah Constitution (T. 
28-29). The court ruled in a minute entry as follows: "The 
defendant's motion to reconsider his motion to suppress, was 
considered, and the court sustained it's original ruling. The court 
believed that confession made by the defendant was done in a 
non-accusatory environment." (R. 108). 
Basic tenets of federalism call for this Court to enforce 
the Utah Constitution in this case. The United States of America is 
a federation of state governments. The states preceded the 
federation and hold general, residual powers to govern, which are 
limited only by the state and federal constitutions. In contrast, 
the federal government's powers are limited to those enumerated in 
the federal constitution. See e.g. Constitution of United States, 
Amendment X. This federalist form of government is based on 
historical distrust, fear and confinement of centralized government, 
and historical trust and empowerment of local governments to 
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represent and serve the citizens of each state. See e.g. Manning v. 
Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549, 553-554 (Utah 1973)(Crockett, J. 
concurring, joined by Ellett, J., and Henriod, J.)* 
Federalist reliance on local government and limitation of 
federalized government is reflected in the differences between state 
and federal constitutions. State constitutions are tailored to the 
regions they govern; they are detail€»d and specific; they are 
dynamic. On the other hand, the federal constitution is uniform, 
general, and unchanging. Compare the frequently amended Utah 
Constitution with the federal constitution. See also Utah Code Ann, 
section 63-54-1 et sea. (Utah Constitution Revision Study Commission 
crated to study Utah Constitution, inform governor and legislature 
of needed changes). 
Federalism is a principle that is important in Utah. The 
people of this state historically have cherished local government 
and fought to limit federal intrusion into questions of state law. 
E.g. E.B. Firmage and R.C. Mangrum, Zion in the Courts, 130-260; 
L.J. Arrington and D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience. 161-184. Our 
state supreme court was perhaps the last state court to accept 
"incorporation" of provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights. See 
e.g. Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah 
1973)(Crockett, J. concurring, joined by Ellett, J., and Henriod, 
J.)(federal incorporation doctrine is disingenuous, violative of 
principles of federalism; first amendment to United States 
Constitution does not apply to state actors). 
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The Utah Constitution originally came into force in 1896. 
Constitution of Utah, Article XXIV, §16. Since then, it has changed 
markedly to accommodate changing times. The Constitution Revision 
and Study Commission continues to monitor the need to adapt the Utah 
Constitution, and the Utah legislature and Utah voters continue to 
amend the Utah Constitution. Every attorney licensed to practice in 
the Utah bar is bound by oath to uphold the Utah Constitution. 
In the instant case, trial counsel raised the Utah 
Constitution after federal analysis was complete, in a separate 
motion, memorandum and hearing. The trial court provided a separate 
ruling under the Utah Constitution. As part of the plea bargain, 
the State agreed that Mr. James could appeal the trial court's 
rulings under both the Utah and Federal Constitutions (R. 114). 
This Court should rule on the Utah Constitutional issues. 
B. UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE FAILURE OF THE POLICE TO INFORM 
MR. JAMES OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS AT THE OUTSET OF THE INTERROGATION, 
AND RECORD THE INTERROGATION REQUIRES THE SUPPRESSION OF ALL OF MR. 
JAMES' STATEMENTS. 
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
"The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself[.]" Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6 (2)(c) also provides, "No 
person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself[.]" 
The requirement that the police inform defendants of their 
Miranda rights and obtain waivers of those rights prior to custodial 
interrogation should be explicitly adopted under Article I section 
12. Utah courts historically have recognized that Miranda-like 
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warnings are necessary to protect fundamental constitutional 
rights. For instance, in State v. Assenberg, 244 P. 1027 (Utah 
1926), the court reversed a criminal conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter because the trial court had admitted into evidence at 
the criminal trial the statements made by the defendant when he was 
examined und€»r oath at a coronor's inquest. Without specifying any 
constitutional basis, the court stated, 
In the instant case the accident which 
caused the death occurred on the evening of June 
1, 1925. Appellant was on that same evening 
placed under arrest and lodged in the county jail 
and remained there until the date of the 
inquest. While it is true no formal charge had 
been filed against him accusing him of crime, 
nevertheless he was, to all practical purposes, 
under arrest for the commission of the offense 
for which he was later tried and convicted. He 
was a young man, 19 years of age, was without 
knowledge of his legal rights, and, so far as 
appears from the record, he had not consulted 
with nor had he the benefit of the advice of 
counsel. He was not cautioned as to his right to 
answer questions nor of his privilege to refuse 
to testify. Neither was he cautioned that any 
statement made by him at the time could or might 
be used against him in a subsequent prosecution. 
He was not subpoenaed by any process issued by 
the coroner and did not attend the inquest in 
answer to any legal process issued by the coronor 
or other official. It appears without dispute 
that the deputy sheriff simply stated to him to 
come and go with the officer, and he was by the 
deputy sheriff conveyed to the place of hearing. 
Under that state of facts, can it be said that 
the statements made by the appellant were 
voluntarily made? We think not. 
Id. at 1028 (emphasis added). 
The majority of the court assumed the applicability of the 
Miranda requirements and exclusionary rule in Sandy City v. Larson. 
733 P.2d 137 (Utah 1987). The court applied the Miranda warnings 
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requirement under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution in 
Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170-1171 (Utah 1983). 
Under Article I section 12 and earner, Miranda warnings are required 
when the interrogation becomes custodial or accusatory in light of 
the following considerations: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2) 
whether the investigation is focused on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and 
form of the interrogation." earner, 664 P.2d at 1171 (citation 
omitted). The protection provided by the earner decision is broader 
than the protection of federal cases interpreting Miranda, which 
require the warnings only if the defendant is in custody and 
interrogated. See Berkemer v. McCartv, 469 U.S. 420, 434 
(1984)(discussing custody); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 434 
(1984)(discussing interrogation). 
In In Re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), 
in interpreting the Attorney General's Subpoena Powers Act, the 
court adopted warnings patterned after Miranda in order to protect 
the privilege against self-incrimination provided by Article I 
section 12 and the fifth amendment. Id. at 647-49. The court noted 
coercive nature of incommunicado interrogations, which raised 
self-incrimination concerns, and prompted the court to adopt 
Miranda-like warnings. 
This Court should follow these precedents and hold that the 
trial court was incorrect in ruling that Mr. James7 rights under the 
Utah Constitution were not violated because the environment during 
the interrogation was not "accusatorial." (R. 108). At the time of 
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the interrogation, Mr. James was charged with the offense and in 
jail. Under earner, the interrogation was accusatorial, rather than 
investigatory, and the police owed Mr. James a Miranda warning at 
the outset of the interrogation. 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
This Court should further hold under Article I section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution that when the police inexcuseably fail to 
record custodial interrogations or otherwise fail to provide a 
reliable record of the interrogations, the fruits of the 
interrogations are inadmissible. As Texas courts have recognized 
for years, "[0]ral confessions of guilt, or oral admissions against 
interest, made by one in custody are inadmissible evidence because 
they are so liable to be misunderstood, so easily fabricated, and so 
hard to be contradicted. See Gay v. State, 2 Tex. App. 127 (1877), 
and Rilev v. State, 4 Tex.App. 538 (1878)." Shiflet v. State, 732 
S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court's Carter decision, discussed supra, 
does not specify a state or federal constitutional basis for its 
mandate that the police create reliable records of confessions. 
However, there are precedents under the State Constitution which 
call for this rule. For instance, in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court, dealing in the context of 
eyewitness identification, held that the Utah Constitution's due 
process provision requires greater scrutiny for the reliability of 
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that kind of evidence. Id. at 780. Following Ramirez in the 
context of this case, this Court should first recognize that 
unrecorded confessions, like eye-witness identification evidence, 
are unreliable, and yet highly impressive to jurors. Cf. e.g. 
Spano. supra. This Court should enforce the Utah due process 
provision by holding that the unrecorded statements of Mr. James are 
inadmissible because they are not reliable. 
In In Re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), 
in construing the Attorney General's Subpoena Powers Act to avoid 
state and federal constitutional concerns, the court required that 
copies of all transcripts of investigative testimony be filed with 
the court, noting that this requirement would facilitate judicial 
review of compliance with the Miranda-like warning requirement. Id. 
at 654 and n.24. Following In Re Criminal Investigation, this 
Court's adoption of a recording requirement under the State 
Constitution will facilitate judicial enforcement of the rights at 
stake in custodial interrogations. See also Foote v. Board of 
Pardons. 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991)("[T]he mandate of article I 
section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution is 
comprehensive in its application to all activities of state 
government. It is the province of the judiciary to assure that a 
claim of denial of due process by an arm of government be heard, 
and, if justified, that it be vindicated."). 
C. ELSTAD IS INCONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
In addition to ruling that Mr. James' right to Miranda 
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warnings under Article I section 12 was violated, this Court should 
presume in this case that Mr. James7 unwarned admission tainted his 
purported Miranda waiver and subsequent confession obtained after 
the police belatedly gave him the Miranda warnings. See Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318-364 (dissenting opinion of Justice 
Brennan). Such a presumption reflects common sense. 
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of 
the bag by confessing, no matter what the 
inducement, he is never thereafter free of the 
psychological and practical disadvantages of 
having confessed. He can never get the cat back 
in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such 
a sense, a later confession always may be looked 
upon as a fruit of the first. 
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947). Numerous courts 
have recognized the coercive effect of unwarned statements on 
subsequent post-Miranda statements, and have required the 
prosecution to rebut the presumption of coercion cast on the 
post-Miranda statements with evidence in addition to the giving of 
Miranda warnings. See Justice Brennan's Elstad dissent, 470 U.S. 
322-323 and nn. 3-6. 
Such a rule would simplify police procedure and 
adjudication of Article I section 12 rights. Cf. Justice Stevens' 
Elstad dissent, 470 U.S. at 364-372. 
Important deterrence of police misconduct is served through 
requiring the State to overcome the presumption of coercion. As 
Justice Brennan explained in Elstad, professional interrogators know 
that once the "cat is out of the bag," it is much easier to obtain 
full confessions, even if the subsequent confessions are preceded by 
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warnings. Police must be encouraged to inform citizens of their 
rights up front, and to scrupulously honor those rights in all 
instances. 470 U.S. 328-332. 
The Elstad opinion is inconsistent with Miranda, and 
threatens to blur the bright line rules established in that 
cornerstone of constitutional law governing police conduct. E.g. 
Kamisar, "Heavy Blow Delivered by Miranda Decisions," 7 National Law 
Journal, September 2, 1985 S-22, column 2. This Court should reject 
this confusing precedent under the Utah Constitution. Cf. e.g. 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-473 (Utah 1990)(plurality)(court 
reviews confusion in federal search and seizure law, and departs 
therefrom under simplier state constitutional analysis). 
Adopting a rebuttable presumption of taint from unwarned 
statements will encourage police officers to take their Miranda 
responsibilities seriously, and is thus consistent with earner and 
other precedents under Article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, which require the government to treat those subject to 
the State's overwhelming powers of accusation with honesty and 
fairness. See State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 184 and 192 (Utah 
1943)(plurality)(under Article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, "'Although no unbending, universal rule can be laid 
down by which to determine whether subsequent confessions in a 
criminal case are admissible, when the former confessions were 
obtained by improper influences, yet in each case the inquiry must 
be whether, considering the degree of intelligence of the prisoner, 
and all the attendant circumstances, it is affirmatively shown that 
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the effect of the primary improper inducement was so entirely 
obliterated from his mind that the subsequent confession could not 
have been in the slightest degree influenced by it; and if there be 
any doubt on this question, it must be resolved in favor of the 
prisoner, and the confession must be excluded.'")(citations 
omitted). See also State v. Ruggeri. 429 P.2d 969 (Utah 1967)(under 
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, it was improper to 
fail to warn a witness at a grand jury proceedings that he was the 
target of the investigation); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 
633 (Utah 1988)(under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
in exercising subpoena powers, the attorney general must give 
Miranda-like warnings). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's rulings 
admitting Mr. James' statements, which were taken in violation of 
Article I sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the 
Miranda decision. 
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•
7
 / J* 
,ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Attorney for Mr. James 
Attorney for lpd. James 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that I have caused to 
be served eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals 
and four copies of the foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this / V) day of 
October, 1992. 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of October, 1992. 
-47-
APPENDIX 1 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Amendment X to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people. 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of 
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, 
or in any way abridged, except for participation 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or 
under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer 
of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution 
of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same or 
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the 
United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation 
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Amendment XXIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
The right of citizens of the United States 
to vote in any primary or other election for 
President or Vice President, for electors for 
President or Vice President, or for Senator or 
Representative in Congress, shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or any State by 
reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other 
tax. 
Section 2. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 52. Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, 
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to 
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests 
for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the esvidence or appear in 
an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the 
court. The trial court need not enter findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 
56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than 
one ground. 
APPENDIX 2 
Trial Court's Oral Findings 
THE COURT: NOW LET ME GET THAT STRAIGHT. 
WHEN HE WAS ASKED ABOUT EMPLOYMENT, THAT'S WHEN HE 
VOLUNTEERED THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE BURGLARIES. 
MS. BOWMAN: THAT'S WHAT HIS POSITION IS, 
YES. 
THE COURT: I HAVE TO READ THAT CASE. 
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH READING MIRANDA 
BEFORE THEY START QUESTIONING? IT TAKES ABOUT TWO 
SECONDS. WHY GO THROUGH ALL THIS? AND THEN AFTER HE 
MAKES THE ADMISSION, THEN WE GET TO THIS PROBLEM HERE 
TODAY. 
MR. MORGAN: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE RECENT 
CASES-- THERE'S ONE EVEN MORE RECENT THAN OREGON V. 
ELSTAD WHICH SAYS THAT THE PURPOSE OF MIRANDA IS THE 
INTERROGATION, AND STATEMENTS SUCH AS BOOKING QUESTIONS 
AND THINGS OF THAT NATURE ARE NOT COVERED BY MIRANDA; 
IT'S NOT DESIGNED TO ELICIT A RESPONSE. 
THE COURT: THE PURPOSE HERE, THOUGH, WAS TO 
SEE IF THEY COULDN'T GET A CONFESSION. THAT'S WHAT THE 
PURPOSE WAS, WAS IT NOT, WHEN THEY BROUGHT HIM INTO THE 
BOOKING OFFICE: NAME, ADDRESS, PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT, 
NEAREST RELATIVE. BUT THERE IS ONE FURTHER POINT. 
MR. MORGAN: THEY DID THAT, THOUGH, YOUR 
HONOR. THEY HAD THE MIRANDA READY. THEY WERE ABOUT TO 
DO THAT. THEY HAD NOT ASKED A SINGLE QUESTION. THERE 
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1 IS NOTHING THAT THESE PEOPLE HAD DONE THAT IS 
2 CONTRARY— 
3 THE COURT: I'LL READ THAT CASE, BUT, 
4 FRANKLY, I'M INCLINED TO SUPPRESS THE CONFESSION. IT 
5 WOULD HAVE ONLY TAKEN THEM ABOUT A SECOND TO READ THAT 
6 WHEN THEY BROUGHT HIM DOWN TO INVESTIGATE; ASK ABOUT 
7 THE CRIME. THAT'S THE FIRST THING THEY OUGHT TO DO, 
8 BECAUSE THEY'VE ALREADY GOT THAT INFORMATION. 
9 WHY DO THEY NEED TO ASK THAT? ALL THEY NEED 
10 TO DO IS LOOK AT THE BOOKING SHEET. 
11 MS. BOWMAN: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE BOTH COPIES— 
12 THE COURT: LET ME LOOK AT THESE CASES. BUT 
13 THAT'S WHERE I'M COMING FROM. 
14 MS. BOWMAN: WHAT'S YOUR PLEASURE? DO YOU 
15 WANT US TO DO A MEMO? 
16 THE COURT: NO. JUST GIVE ME THE TWO CASES. 
17 THERE'S NO USE SPENDING TIME ON IT. YOU'RE BOTH BUSY. 
18 GIVE ME THE CASES AND I'LL READ THEM. 
19 MS. BOWMAN: I DIDN'T BRING ELSTAD. BUT 
20 SAMPSON DOES DEAL WITH-- SAMPSON IS IN A MORE 
21 RESTRICTIVE LIGHT. 
22 THE COURT: I DON'T THINK THIS FALLS IN THE 
23 CATEGORY OF BOOKING. THERE IS A CATEGORY-- BROUGHT HIM 
24 DOWN FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF INTERROGATING HIM ABOUT 
25 THE CRIME. WHEN THEY BROUGHT HIM THERE, THE FIRST 
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THING THEY SHOULD HAVE SAID IS THIS IS WHAT WE'RE HERE 
FOR. YOU READ HIM MIRANDA, AND THEN THERE WOULD BE NO 
PROBLEM. 
MR. MORGAN: THE OREGON CASE, YOUR HONOR, 
JUST INTRODUCED TO YOU, SAYS THAT MIRANDA IS A 
PROPHYLACTIC MEASURE, NOT SOMETHING THAT PREVENTS 
PEOPLE FROM TALKING. IT IS JUST SOMETHING THAT GETS 
YOU TO THE POINT OF LETTING THE DEFENDANT KNOW WHAT HIS 
RIGHTS ARE. 
THE REAL ISSUE IS, IS IT VOLUNTARY UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES? AND THERE'S NO QUESTION IN THIS CASE 
THAT IT WAS A VOLUNTARY STATEMENT, AND THE ONLY 
QUESTION IS WHETHER IT'S ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF LACK OF 
MIRANDA. AND MIRANDA IS GOING OUT THE WINDOW SLOWLY. 
5 I THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THAT. 
6 MR. MORGAN: AND IT WOULD BE THE UNDERLYING 
7 VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONFESSION. THIS IS NOT A FRUIT-
8 OF-THE-POISONOUS-TREE PROBLEM. IT'S WHAT WAS SAID 
9 AFTER MIRANDA, AND WHETHER WHAT WAS SAID AFTER MIRANDA 
0 WAS GIVEN VOLUNTARILY; WHICH IT WAS, AND IT IS 
1 CIRCUMSCRIBED BY MIRANDA ADMONITIONS, AND KNOWING 
2 THOSE, THAT THE PERSON TALKS. THERE'S NOTHING WRONG 
3 WITH THAT. 
4 THE COURT: BUT THE FACT REMAINS, IN THIS 
5 CASE, THE CONFESSION WAS MADE BEFORE THE MIRANDA WAS 
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1 GIVEN, SO YOU CAN'T THEN COME BACK AND SAY: WELL, I 
2 GAVE THE MIRANDA, GOT THE SAME CONFESSION. 
3 MR. MORGAN: THAT'S WHAT OREGON HOLDS. 
4 THE COURT: WELL, THEY MAY HAVE HELD THAT. 
5 MS. BOWMAN: I TAKE ISSUE WITH THE 
6 DESCRIPTION OF VOLUNTARY. HE'S BROUGHT OUT; NOT TOLD 
7 WHY HE'S BROUGHT OUT. 
8 THE COURT: I'M INCLINED TO GO ALONG WITH 
9 YOU, AND BECAUSE IT'S ONLY-- MIRANDA MAY BE ON ITS WAY 
10 OUT, BUT UNTIL IT IS, AND WHEN THEY BRING THEM DOWN FOR 
11 INTERROGATION, THE LEAST THEY CAN DO IS TAKE TWO 
12 MINUTES, OR WHATEVER IT TAKES, TO READ THE MIRANDA 
13 RIGHTS A N D — SO, DESPITE THAT CASE, I'M INCLINED T O — 
14 MR. MORGAN: YOUR HONOR, THERE'S ONE OTHER 
15 CASE I WOULD LIKE TO BRING TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION, 
16 STATE V. GINSHOP, AS WELL. 
17 THE COURT: AS I SAY, BASED UPON MY 
18 KNOWLEDGE AT THIS TIME, AND I CAN BE CORRECTED, BUT I'M 
19 INCLINED TO SUPPRESS IT, SUPPRESS THE CONFESSION. 
20 MR. MORGAN: YOU'LL GET THOSE TWO CASES. 
21 THE COURT: OKAY. FINE. 
2 2 MS. BOWMAN: HOW DO YOU WANT TO HANDLE THIS? 
23 I DON'T THINK WE HAVE TIME TO FINISH TODAY. I THINK 
24 WE'RE GOING TO SET ANOTHER DATE AFTER TODAY? 




Trial Court's Oral Ruling 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1992; P.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: STATE VS. EDWARD JAMES, 
4 911900562. 
5 MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THE DEFENDANT IS 
6 PRESENT REPRESENTED BY MRS. BOWMAN AND THE STATE IS 
7 REPRESENTED BY MR. MORGAN. 
8 AND I GUESS YOU WANT TO KNOW WHAT MY RULING 
9 WAS ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. AFTER READING THE 
0 CASES, IT APPEARS TO ME, EVEN THOUGH MY FEELINGS WERE 
1 TO THE CONTRARY, I THINK I OUGHT TO SUPPRESS. I THINK 
2 THE CASES HOLD MR. MORGAN'S POSITION. AND I DON'T FEEL 
3 VERY GOOD ABOUT IT, BUT I THINK THAT'S WHAT THE LAW IS 
4 TODAY. 
5 MS. BOWMAN: WELL, I THINK WE WILL CERTAINLY 
6 NEED A WRITTEN RULING WITH THE RATIONALE SET OUT FOR 
7 PURPOSES OF APPEAL, YOUR HONOR. 
8 MR. MORGAN: I WILL PREPARE A FINDINGS OF 
9 FACT. 
0 MR. MORGAN: AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
1 THE COURT: AS I EXPRESSED BEFORE, MY 
2 OPINION— 
3 MS. BOWMAN: IS IT ELSTAD THAT YOU'RE RELYING 
4 ON? 
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THE COURT: IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, IT 
APPEARS THAT HE VOLUNTARILY MADE THE STATEMENT, EVEN 
THOUGH I AM OF THE OPINION THEY OUGHT TO READ THE 
MIRANDA WARNING AT THE TIME THEY BRING HIM DOWN FOR THE 
INTERVIEW. 
I'LL PREPARE A LITTLE MEMORANDUM AND GIVE 
THAT TO YOU, BUT AFTER READING THAT CASE, THOSE CASES, 
OVER THE WEEKEND, I CAME TO THAT CONCLUSION, DESPITE 
HOW I FEEL. 
MR. MORGAN: I WILL HAVE THOSE PRESENTED TO 
THE COURT IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS. 
WE WOULD NEED A TRIAL DATE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. HOW SOON DO YOU WANT TO 
TRY THIS CASE? 
MS. BOWMAN: YOUR HONOR, I UNDERSTAND HE'S IN 
CUSTODY, BUT I. HAVE A FULL CALENDAR THROUGH THE END OF 
MAY, PRETTY FULL INTO JUNE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHEN DO YOU WANT TO 
TRY IT? YOU TELL ME. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
EDWARD H. JAMES, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 911900562FS 
Before Hon. John A. Rokich 
A hearing on Defendants Motion to Suppress came before this 
Court on May 8, 1991, the State being represented by its counsel, 
B. Kent Morgan, Deputy County Attorney, and the defendant being 
present and represented by his counsel, Elizabeth A. Bowman, 
Esq., and the Court having taken testimony in the matter, having 
heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the authorities submitted 
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters 
its: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail on the evening of March 28, 1991 for the offense of 
Burglary, a Second Degree Felony in violation of §76-6-202 U.C.A. 
and Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor alleged to have been committed 
at 355 North 700 West, Salt Lake County, Utah on the same day as 
his arrest. 
2. From the time of his arrest until the interview conducted 
the following morning at 10:14 O'clock A. M., the defendant was 
not questioned by the police about any matter. At no time did 
the defendant invoke his right to remain silent or request 
counsel. 
3. On March 29, 1991, the defendant was called out from the 
general population into the booking area of the jail and 
confronted by Salt Lake City Police Detectives Gary Newren and 
Steve Cheever who immediately announced they were police officers 
whose purpose was to discuss the burglary committed the previous 
day. 
4. The detectives then asked the defendant general questions 
about his identity for the purpose of ascertaining whether the 
correct person was being interviewed. 
5. Detective Cheever questioned the defendant about his 
present employment to which the defendant responded that he was 
presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, volunteered that 
during times when he was unemployed was when he got into trouble, 
that this is when he gets things into his head and does them, and 
admitted to the burglary. 
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6. Detectives Newren and Cheever interrupted the defendant 
and read him his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, to which 
the defendant responded that he understood each of those rights 
and agreed to speak to the Detectives about the burglary. The 
defendant thereupon gave a detailed confession about the 
burglary. 
7. No coercion or deception of any kind was exercised by the 
Detectives in order to induce the defendant to speak with the 
police. 
Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The mere fact that the defendant was in jail and called 
into the booking area does not render any statement made in 
response to police questioning involuntary under the totality of 
the circumstances, but rather is only a factor to be considered 
among the other circumstances of the interview. Based on the 
uncontradicted testimony of the Detectives who conducted the 
interview that the defendant freely volunteered the information 
requested and was subjected to neither coercion, physical or 
psychological, or induced to speak as a result of promises or 
deception of any kind, the Court concludes the defendant's 
statements were voluntarily given under the totality of the 
circumstances. 
2. The police are not required to give Miranda admonitions 
to a defendant who is in custody prior to asking routine booking 
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questions which the police have no reason to know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response. The questions 
elicited prior to giving Miranda admonitions in this case were 
merely requesting biographical datci to assure the interviewing 
detectives that they were about to question the right suspect. 
3. Notwithstanding any unwarned but nonetheless voluntary 
statement made prior to the Miretnda warnings in this case, even 
if the unwarned statements resulted from interrogation within the 
meaning of Miranda, there is no constitutional requirement that 
this Court suppress the defendant's post-Miranda statements. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
Defendants Motion to Suppress is denied. 
<sl DATED this o(T day of May, 1991. 
fJL-*&Jd. 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING/DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this JX^ day of May, 1991. 
